The problem
Regulated enterprises are deploying autonomous agents into systems governed by rules written for human operators. Access must exist for a valid business need. Changes must be approved and documented. Every action against sensitive information must leave an audit trail detailed enough to serve as forensic evidence. An agent satisfies none of that by default: it holds broad credentials because narrow ones are inconvenient, it acts faster than any approval process, and its reasoning trace is not an audit trail, because an explanation of a decision is not a record of an action. The obligations already apply. Nothing yet proves they were met.
What it proves
That every action an agent took against sensitive information produced a record naming the agent, the authority it acted under, the records touched, and the time. Not a model trace. A structured action record.
For every action, that it fell inside the boundary the agent was authorised to operate in, and where an action fell outside it, that the breach was identified with the policy it violated rather than discovered later in a log review.
That every state change an agent initiated maps to an approval, and that changes with no approval behind them are named rather than absorbed.
That agent access to personal data stayed inside the consented purpose, and that erasure and withdrawal obligations were honoured across records an agent touched.
The same obligation can appear in several Directions, one per entity class, with different clause numbers. AssureNode binds your control to the clause in the instrument that applies to you.
Where we stop
RBI published the FREE-AI Committee Report, its Framework for Responsible and Ethical Enablement of Artificial Intelligence, in August 2025. It is a committee report and it is not binding. The obligations above are not AI regulation. They are the existing IT governance and data protection duties that already apply to any actor operating inside a regulated system, including an autonomous one. When AI-specific Directions arrive, they will land on top of these rather than replace them. That is why we prove against the obligations that bind today.
What you get
Every action with the agent, the authority it acted under, and the records touched.
Each action evaluated against the boundary the agent was authorised to operate in.
State changes with no approval behind them, named rather than absorbed.
Whether agent access to personal data stayed inside the consented purpose.
A free scoping review. One obligation, one source system, two weeks.
We are selecting design partners for each solution. Early partners decide which obligations we prove first.